Problem of Induction & Problems of Confirmation Patrick Maher, "Probabilities for New Theories" Haim Gaifman, "Reasoning with Limited Resources and Assigning Probabilities to Arithmetical Statements"Įllery Eells, "Problems of Old Evidence" (reprinted as "Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence")ĭavid Christensen, "Measuring Confirmation"Įllery Eells and Branden Fitelson, "Measuring Confirmation and Evidence"īranden Fitelson, "The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity"Ĭharles Chihara, "Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory" Richard Jeffrey, "Bayesianism with a Human Face" Ian Hacking, "Slightly More Realistic Personal Probabilities" 19, Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience (NOTE CHANGE IN DATE!)ĭaniel Garber, "Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory" Mark Colyvan, "The Philosophical Significance of Cox's Theorem" Glenn Shafer, "Comments on 'Constructing a Logic of Plausible Inference: A Guide to Cox's Theorem', by Kevin S. Richard Cox, "Probability, Frequency, and Reasonable Expectation" ![]() Jaynes, Probability Theory: the Logic of Science, sections of Chapters 1 and 2 (obtained from Larry Bretthorst's page on Jaynes at ) Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew, "An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy", "An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy"ĭavid Lindley, "Scoring Rules and the Inevitability of Probability"Į.T. James Joyce, "Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief" James Joyce, "A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism" James Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (1999) Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (1990) Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (1972) You might look up the following books and find the relevant chapters for more modern presentations of versions of this argument Paul Teller, "Conditionalization and Observation"ĭavid Christensen, "Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs" No required reading, but we will go over the basics of probability theory in class, and some basic discussion of the interpretation of probability.Īlan Hájek, "Interpretations of Probability", in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophyĭavid Christensen, "Dutch-book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers" Depending on student interest, we may continue with extended discussion of one or two critics of Bayesianism, or shorter discussion of several distinct criticisms. This seminar will begin with an overview of the probability theory that will be needed for the rest of the class, and then continue with some arguments in favor of Bayesianism and Bayesian accounts of some traditional problems of confirmation. Opponents raise several important problems for Bayesianism, including the problem of the priors, the problem of old evidence, and the problem of new theories. Defenders, called Bayesians, say this account can additionally help us understand the importance of having evidence from a variety of sources, theories that provide a good explanation of the evidence, and various other features of scientific reasoning. ![]() ![]() Some philosophers of science have argued that by focusing on probabilistic notions like degree of belief, we can give a good account of the notions of scientific evidence and confirmation, thus giving us a handle on parts of the problem of induction.
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